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Introduction
Kenneth Arrow argued that trust is the lubricant of an economy (Arrow, 1974) . Alan Greenspan describes trust as the root of any economic system based on mutually beneficial exchange (Greenspan, 1999) . Attempts to provide economic theory and related tests regarding the role of trust as a lubricant and root of society are in their infancy. Underpinnings for deeper aspects of how trust can relate to the vast set of economic institutions that exist in complex economic environments are starting to be explored in laboratory and archival studies of record keeping Waymire, 2006 and Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry and . This dissertation examines theoretically and experimentally how the economic institution of disclosure in the form of voluntary disclosure is based on trust and trustworthiness. Other literature (e.g. Grossman, 1981 and Dye, 1985a) base the existence of voluntary disclosure on investors' beliefs regarding manager's information about the value of the firm. Generally, managers with superior values voluntarily reveal their private information about value since otherwise investors will assume non-disclosed values are low. In setting with trustworthy and untrustworthy managers, choosing to voluntarily disclose is a natural act of the trustworthy manager which the untrustworthy manager will mimic to receive additional future investments.
In such a setting voluntary disclosure necessarily stimulates investment compared to a setting with no disclosure opportunities.
The basic setting derives from the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) . I augment this setting to incorporate disclosure issues. A sender is endowed with some wealth each period and decides how much of his endowment to invest in partnership with a receiver.
The amount invested by the sender is multiplied by a stochastic multiplier before it reaches the receiver. While the receiver learns the stochastic multiplier, the sender does not. This allows for definition of income reporting on completion of a 'venture'. In a second setting, re-investment of the multiplied amount received by the receiver is allowed thus allowing for reporting of balance sheets and periodic reporting of income. Disclosure facilitates trust and stimulates investment in both settings.
These augmentations have real world counterparts in contemporary accounting but also have two historical parallels. One of the settings analyzed bears resemblance to venture accounting of Venetian merchants of fifteenth and sixteenth century (Lane, 1945) . It entails computation of profit or loss on completion of a venture. The second setting permits reporting of periodic income and of balance sheet which occurs when a business lasts a number of periods. Periodic reporting was popular with Florentine cloth manufacturers (DeRoover, 1963) in medieval times and thereafter with chartered and incorporated companies. In both settings, I solve for a sequential equilibrium of the game-theoretic model and test it experimentally. The model derives from Kreps and Wilson, 1982 while the experimental test derives from Camerer and Weigelt, 1988 .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Sections 3 and 4 develop the model. Sections 5 and 6 look at the experiment design and data analysis. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Literature Review

Historical Review
Historically, disclosure in the form of voluntary financial reporting is an institutional structure that like several other accounting institutions arose as an 'evolved social convention, supported only by informal sanctions and market consequences (Jamal, Maier and Sunder, 2005) '. An instance of early use of financial reports is the Bank of Medici. It used double-entry bookkeeping and produced balance sheets for branch units as early as 1433 (DeRoover, 1963) . By this time balance sheets were being regularly produced and used for both purposes of control as well as taxation. Florentine cloth manufacturers of fifteenth and sixteenth century typically balanced their books at fairly regular intervals and calculated 'returns earned on the business as a whole'.
As against the Florentine method, the Venetian merchants used venture accounting to determine profit or loss on every venture. It enabled a merchant 'to calculate not regularly but easily and realistically his profits and losses' (Lane, 1945) .
The advent of the chartered companies in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the next big influence in that it veered from determination of profit or loss on a venture to regular determination of income. The early chartered companies include the British East India Company, the Virginia Company, the Massachusetts Bay Company, the Hudson Bay Company, the Muscovy Company and the Dutch East India Company. The influence of the corporation is summarized by Littleton, 1933 as -'The transformation of speculative ventures having terminable stocks into continuing businesses with permanently invested capital is the development of most interest here……Money invested in a corporation's stock is not a "venture" from which a profit or loss will materialize, when a "division" is made, but is rather a long-lived "investment" from which periodic returns will flow.' This paper focuses on an environment where reporting is not required by regulation. The model and the experiment developed later look at both a venture accounting setting ('no reinvestment model') and at one with periodic determination of income ('reinvestment model'). 
Background and Motivation
The basic setting for the model and the experiment is of an investment game. I will first discuss the investment game ( Figure 1) . A sender is endowed with $10. He decides how much of this 1 Social convention often is followed by formal mechanisms to broaden their application.
Incorporation by registration was introduced in Britain by Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844.
This act required the preparation and presentation before shareholders of a 'full and fair' balance sheet. The Act, however, did not require the preparation of a profit and loss account. The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856 that replaced the Act of 1844 actually abandoned compulsory accounting and compulsory audit requirements for registered companies. However this Act introduced a model set of Articles which were to apply to every registered company unless it was registered with its own particular Articles (Littleton and Yamey, 1956) . The model Articles required the preparation and presentation before shareholders of a balance sheet and a profit and loss account. While in Britain, the parliament regulated business and capital markets through Companies Acts, American regulations at that time were based on state laws. By mid 1800s, balance sheets were being voluntarily disclosed in the US but income statement disclosure was only occasional. Regulated reporting was minimal till after the Great Depression (Giroux, 1999) . endowment to send to a receiver. The amount send by the sender (denoted by 'm' in figure 1) is tripled before it reaches the receiver. The receiver decides how much of this tripled amount to keep (denoted by 'k' in figure 1 ) and how much to send back (denoted by '3m -k' in Figure 1 ). Dickhaut, Lunawat, Waymire and Xin, 2007 take this setting and replace the multiplier of 3 by a stochastic multiplier. In their setting, the multiplier is equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. The receiver learns the multiplier but the sender does not. This allows for a definition of income in Figure 1 -Investment Game their setting. It is the amount received by the receiver before sending something back. There are several senses in which this number is income. First is the notion of flow to the unit in terms of the revenue (or product) to the firm. Literally it is what comes into the firm. This is the way income is used in the national income accounts. Accountants on the other hand are generally are reporting "net income" which is the amount before distributions are made to owners. In the Dickhaut et. al. setting the amount received by the receiver is accounting income when receiver is considered a managing partner and the owner / sender as an investing partner which was typical in Venetian setting.
Sender
• Gets $10.
• Sends m.
• Keeps $10-m.
Receiver
• Gets 3 m.
• Keeps k.
• Sends back R= 3 m -k.
3m 3m-k
This study models 2-person firms where 1 sender is paired with 1 receiver. This setting is repeated for 3 periods. Since this paper examines the role of reputation formation in emergence of financial reporting, it uses a finite game (unlike Dickhaut et. al.) where the subjects know the number of periods they will be playing. Dickhaut, Hubbard and McCabe, 2005 play a repeated investment game, where the subjects play the investment game for 2 periods. They find evidence of reputation formation in this The results of this model are tested experimentally.
Then, reinvestment is introduced in the setting to show that financial statements (namely, income statement and balance sheet) further have the ability to augment reputations. In this setting the receiver at the beginning of the period can commit to the income reporting as discussed in the previous setting as well as to reporting the total amount retained by the firm at the end of the period. Income for a period is the amount retained from previous periods plus investment in the period both times a stochastic multiplier. The new information item is balance sheet information which is the amount retained at the end of the period. Note in this setting this is complete balance sheet information since the retained earnings (per accounting convention) will be equivalent to the amount reinvested in operations.
No reinvestment model
Model
There are two players, A (sender) and B (receiver). Nature moves first and selects B's type to be either Trustworthy or Untrustworthy. B knows his type but A does not. The game then proceeds through 3 periods in each of which the A and B make a sequence of choices. A is endowed with 10 units of wealth each period and decides how much of the 10 units to send to B (denoted by 'm'). The amount sent by A is multiplied before it reaches B. The multiplier (denoted by 'λ') is stochastic in that it is equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. B decides how much of the multiplied amount ('λm') to keep for himself (denoted by 'k') and how much to return to A ('λm -k'). Note 
Full Information Benchmark
Consider a world where A sees the multiplied amount B receives. That is, B has no private information. In this world, B makes no disclosure decision. Now, the strategy of trustworthy B is (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988) . 'm t ' denotes the amount A invests / sends in period t and 'λ t ' denotes the multiplier in period t. Define t 3 = 2 / E(l 3 ). Now A invests all (set m 3 = 10) in period
and invests nothing (set m 3 = 0) if
. Similarly, a threshold t t can be defined for every period t such that A invests all in period t if
. These values of t t are graphed in figure 4 . It can be seen from the equation for t t and from figure 4 that t t increases over time. This shows that B's reputation has to be progressively higher over time for A to invest. play a mixed strategy, returning frequently enough that if he does return, the updated R P 3 will be equal to t 3 , so that A will be willing to invest in period 3 (Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory).
Similarly, untrustworthy B plays a mixed strategy in period 1.
Denote by R t S the probability that untrustworthy B returns in period t. If A uses Bayes Rule to update probabilities then posterior probability 
A always invests (because he believes the probability B is trustworthy is very high).
Consequently untrustworthy B does not mix between returning and not returning. Instead he plays a pure strategy of returning half of what he receives in both periods 1 and 2 and then in period 3, does not return anything to A.
No Disclosure Regime
Consider a world where there is no disclosure. A does not learn the multiplied amount B receives and B cannot share the knowledge of this multiplied amount with A even if he wants to. That is, B will make no disclosure decision. A plays threshold strategy here but untrustworthy B plays a .
Disclosure Regime
In this world, B may elect to share the knowledge of the multiplied amount with A. A plays threshold strategy in this regime. Untrustworthy B mixes between returning and not returning in both periods 1 and 2 and then does not return in period 3. B chooses a returning probability such that A's posterior about B's type is exactly equal to the threshold. When the probability that B is trustworthy is at threshold, A mixes between investing and not investing. A chooses an investing probability such that B is indifferent between returning and not returning. B's disclosure decision in period t follows his return decision in period t-1. That is, if he returns in period 1, then he will disclose in period 2 and if he returns in period 2, he will disclose in period 3. A mixed strategy in retuning implies A's posterior about B's type is exactly at the threshold. Consequently, if B disclosure decision in a period follows his return decision from previous period, it will not allow further revision of A's belief which then will remain at the threshold. However, B's period 1 disclosure decision is an exception since it does not follow a return decision from a previous period. If A enters period 1 with a prior belief that is below the threshold for period 1, then B will mix between disclosing and not disclosing in period 1. He will choose a disclosing probability such that A's posterior is exactly equal to the threshold.
Note this regime allows for A's belief revision before his period 1 investment too. Therefore let D P 0 denote the prior belief with which A enters the game (that is, the probability A thinks B is trustworthy in the beginning of the game). As before if D P 0 > τ 3 A always invests (because he believes the probability B is trustworthy is very high). Consequently untrustworthy B does not mix between returning and not returning. Instead he plays a pure strategy of returning half of what he receives in both periods 1 and 2 and then in period 3, does not return anything to A. B's disclosure follows his return from previous period. He always discloses in period 1.
In equilibrium, there is disclosure without any explicit enforcement mechanism. In this sense, the institution of income reporting is a private-order institution. The presence of altruistic / trustworthy agents (or simply the belief that some altruistic agents are out there) disciplines the behavior of self-interested rational agents. The latter want to earn the reputation of being altruistic types and this competition for reputation leads to and sustains income reporting. That is, the institution under consideration is a 'reputation-based private-order' institution (Greif, 2006 ).
In the no disclosure regime, A will invest only if his belief about B's trustworthiness is sufficiently high. However, in the disclosure regime, investment will occur even when A's belief about B's type is not so high because this regime allows for mixed strategy play by B and consequent belief revision by A. Therefore, investment in a disclosure regime will be higher than investment in a no disclosure regime.
In any of the regimes considered above, if the initial probability with which A enters the game is 0 then an unraveling equilibrium will obtain. Even in the regimes that allow for updating of A's beliefs, a prior of 0 implies that A's posterior belief about B's trustworthiness must also be 0.
Reinvestment model
Model
The model described here looks at investment and disclosure decisions in a trust setting. There are two players, A and B. Nature moves first and selects B-player's type to be either Trustworthy or Untrustworthy. B-player knows his type but A-player does not. The game then proceeds through 3 periods in each of which the A and B players make a sequence of choices. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show respectively the sequential structure of choices for periods 1, 2 and 3 of the threeperiod game.
A is endowed with 10 units of wealth each period and decides how much of the 10 units to send to B (amount sent in period t denoted by 'm t '). The amount sent by A is multiplied before it reaches B. The multiplier (multiplier in period t denoted by 'λ t ') is stochastic in that it is equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. B learns the multiplied amount but A does not. B decides how much of the multiplied amount to keep for himself (amount kept in period t denoted by 'k t '), how much to return to A (amount returned in period t denoted by 'R t ') and how much to re-invest (amount reinvested in period t denoted by 'α t '). 'α t ' is reinvestment in the following sense. In period and α t = l t (α t-1 + m t ). He also returns half of what he receives in the last period to A-player. That is, he sets R 3 = l 3 (α 2 + m 3 ) / 2 = k 3 . He always discloses, too.
Full Information Benchmark
Consider a world where A sees the multiplied amount B receives and the reinvestment B makes.
That is, B has no private information. In this world, B makes no disclosure decision. Now, the strategy of trustworthy B is defined by assumption. Untrustworthy B and A choose strategies that will maximize their expected payoff. . Similarly, a threshold t t can be defined for every period t such that A invests all in period t if A always invests (because he believes the probability a B is trustworthy is very high).
Consequently untrustworthy B does not mix between reinvesting all and not-reinvesting all.
Instead he plays a pure strategy of re-investing all he receives till period 2 and then in period 3, does not return anything to A.
No Disclosure Regime
Consider a world where there is no disclosure. A does not see the multiplier or the split made by B of the multiplied amount he receives. That is, B has private information but in this world, B makes no disclosure decision. A plays threshold strategy here but untrustworthy B plays a pure strategy of re-investing all he receives till period 2 and then not returning anything to A in period 3. B plays a pure strategy because his action is not observable in this regime and consequently any mixing by him will not engender belief revisions via Bayesian updating by A. .
Partial Disclosure Regime
In this world, B can disclose only one piece of information, that is, either only the income statement or only the balance sheet can be possibly reported. A plays threshold strategy in this regime. Untrustworthy B plays a pure strategy of re-investing all he receives till period 2 and then not returning anything to A in period 3. (He does not mix between reinvesting all and not reinvesting all because his action is not directly observable.) However, he mixes between disclosing and not disclosing so that A's posterior belief about B's trustworthiness is exactly equal to the threshold beyond which A invests. In period t, B chooses a disclosing probability 
Since the threshold in the partial disclosure regime is the same as the threshold in the full information benchmark case Generalizing B's disclosure decision of period t feeds into A's investment decision of period t. D P 0 denotes the probability A believes B is trustworthy at the beginning of period 1 (It is the prior probability with which A enters the game). As before if D P 0 > τ 3 , A always invests and consequently untrustworthy B may set disclosure probability at any value
).
Full Disclosure Regime
In this world, B can disclose both pieces of his private information, that is, both the income statement and the balance sheet can be possibly reported. A plays threshold strategy.
Untrustworthy B plays a pure strategy of re-investing all he receives till period 2 and then not returning anything to A in period 3. (He does not mix between reinvesting all and not reinvesting all because his action is not directly observable.) However, he mixes between disclosing and not disclosing first piece of information and then mixes between disclosing and not disclosing second piece of information. In period t, B chooses his first disclosing probability S . That is, probability of disclosing first piece of information in the full disclosure regime is higher than probability of re-investing in full information world and probability of disclosing second piece of information in the full disclosure regime is also higher than probability of re-investing in full information world.
D . The probability of disclosing the income statement (or the balance sheet) increases if there is a possibility of disclosing the balance sheet (income statement). This happens because an untrustworthy B can disclose one piece of information with higher probability (even certainty) while mixing on disclosure of other piece of information. < 0 implying that the probability of disclosing one piece of information decreases in the probability of disclosing the other piece of information.
As before if DI P 0 > τ 3 , A always invests and consequently untrustworthy B may set disclosure probability at any value
).In any of the regimes considered above, if the initial probability with which A enters the game is 0 then an unraveling equilibrium should obtain.
Even in the regimes that allow for updating of A's beliefs, a prior of 0 implies that A's posterior belief about B's trustworthiness must also be 0.
In equilibrium, there is disclosure without any explicit enforcement mechanism. In this sense, the institution of disclosure of financial statements is a private-order institution. The presence of altruistic / trustworthy agents (or simply the belief that some altruistic agents are out there) disciplines the behavior of self-interested rational agents. The latter want to earn the reputation of being altruistic types and this competition for reputation leads to and sustains disclosure of financial statements. That is, the institution under consideration is a 'reputation-based privateorder' institution (Greif, 2006) .
In the no disclosure regime, A will invest only if his belief about B's trustworthiness is sufficiently high. However, in the partial / full disclosure regime, investment will occur even when A's belief about B's type is not so high because these regimes allow for mixed strategy play by B and consequent belief revision by A. Therefore, investment in a disclosure regime will be higher than investment in a no disclosure regime.
Another implication of the model is that there will be no dividend payout in any period except the last where a liquidating dividend may be paid out. That is, R t = 0 for t = 1 -2. This is a direct consequence of the assumptions of risk neutrality and no time discounting of money.
Experiment Design
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007) .
Each session of the experiment was run with 16 subjects. Subjects were assigned to the role of an A-player or a B-player. Their role remained unchanged through the session. 1 A-player was grouped with 1 B-player and the players in the group played against each other for 3 periods. At the end of 3 periods, each player was grouped with some other player. No two subjects were grouped twice.
In each period, if the condition warrants that B-player make a disclosure decision, the computer subject's total payoff was converted to Canadian dollars using a pre-announced exchange rate.
An experimenter read the instructions aloud to the subjects, while the subjects followed their own copies of the instructions. After the instructions were read, subjects were asked to answer questions about the experiment. The questions appeared on their computer screen and they were paid 50 cents for every correct answer. The CIRANO Research Institute in Montreal recruited the subjects and ran the experiment.
Data Analysis
Some sessions of the experiment were run in January and this section discusses preliminary results from the data. 16 subjects participated in an hour-and-half long session. The condition used for this session was the disclosure regime of the 'no reinvestment' model. Subjects played 8 sets of 3 periods each. Since 16 subjects were allocated to 8 sets, there were 8 A -B pairs for each set. 8 sets with 8 A -B pairs in each set implies there were 64 observations. Note that no two subjects were paired for more than 1 set. Initial results from this data are described below. Figure 9 shows the average percentage returned in periods 1, 2 and 3. The average is across 64
observations. The average percentage returned in period 3 is lower than that returned in periods 1 and 2 and this is a strong evidence of reputation formation. The prediction about higher investment in economies with disclosure as compared to those without will be tested after there is some data on 'no disclosure' regime. The use of threshold strategy by A (sender / investor) will show up in 'zero' investments and 'maximum' investments, that is, investments of 0 or 10. In moving from the model to data, it is expected that the threshold strategy will show up in 'low' investments and 'high' investments instead of 'all or zero' investments. Defining 'low' investment as investment of 0 -3 liras and 'high' investment as investment of 7 -10 liras, 89.58% investments were in the category of 'high or low' investments ( Figure 10 ). This approach is derived from Dickhaut et al. 1997 .
Average Percentage Returned
Investment Strategy
Invest Low (0-3) or High (7) (8) (9) (10) Other Strategy 
Table 2 -Inferring Prior Probability
In period 1, the average disclosure is 78.13%. Denoting a decision to 'disclose' by 1 and a decision to 'not disclose' by 0, the disclosure probability in period 1 is 0.7813. A disclosure probability of less than 1 implies mixed strategy play by B which in turn implies that the prior probability A believes B is trustworthy is less than the threshold for period 1 (See 3.1.1 and 3.1.3). From the model, the threshold for period 1 is 0.2963 (See 3.1.1 and 3.1.3). With this threshold for period 1 and the disclosing probability in period 1, we can use Bayesian updating formula to infer the prior probability A believes B is trustworthy. The inferred prior probability is 0.2475. (Table 2 ) B's return probability for period 1 and then, overall return probability for period 1. The predicted overall return probability for period 1 is 0.6667. 2 Excluding the first set, the estimated overall return probability for period 1 is 0.6341. Using the standard normal approximation to binomial distribution (an approach similar to the analysis in Camerer and Weigelt, 1988) , the 95% confidence interval for overall return probability in period 1 is (0.6466, 0.6868). The estimated overall return probability for period 1 (excluding first set) is slightly lower than the lower bound of this confidence interval (Table 3) . Using a similar approach, the overall return probability for period 2 is predicted to be 0.6667. Excluding the first set, the estimated overall return probability for period 2 is 0.5882. The 95% confidence interval for overall return probability in period 2 is (0.6123, 0.7210). The confidence interval is substantially larger than what is expected when more data is collected. In estimating the overall return probabilities, consistent with assumptions about out-of-equilibrium beliefs (See 3.3) instances where a B returned more than half were included with those where he returned half and instances where B returned less than half were included with those where he returned nothing.
The model predicts that disclosure in periods 2 and 3 will respectively follow return in periods 1 and 2. That is, if B returns half or more of what he receives in period 1, then with probability 1 he will disclose in period 2 and similarly if he returns half or more of what he receives in period 2 Overall Return Probability in Period 1 (predicted) = Probability B is trustworthy + Probability B is untrustworthy but returns = Probability B is trustworthy + (1 -Probability B is trustworthy) * Probability untrustworthy B returns 
Summary and Conclusions
This study analyzes how reputation affects a manager's disclosure decisions and how such reputation-concern driven disclosure decisions affect an investor's investment decisions. I develop a game-theoretic model and test it experimentally to show that a strategic manager chooses to disclose his private information to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. However, the manager does so selectively instead of indiscriminately in order to ensure credibility associated with his choice. An investor sees a manager's disclosure and forms beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness. The investor, too, invests only selectively in such cases. By enabling managers to build a reputation for being trustworthy, disclosure allows investors to discriminate between manager types. Thereby, disclosure stimulates investment.
will not know the role of any other participant. You will play several sequences of 3 periods each. In the beginning of every 3-period sequence an A-player and a B-player will be grouped for that sequence. No 2 participants will be grouped twice.
Each period proceeds through four stages. The 4 stages are briefly described in Figure 1 .
Figure1 Stage 1 -B-Players' Disclosure Decisions
In Stage 1, B-Player will have the choice of deciding whether s/he wants to let the A-player know the multiplied amount s/he will receive from A. B-player will see the following screen:
Outline of the Stages in Each Period
Stage 1 -B-player decides whether or not private information (multiplied amount) s/he will get in stage 3 will get revealed to A-player in Stage 4. 
Stage 2 -A-Players' Decisions
A-player sees the decision made in Stage 1 by the B-player he is paired with. A-player also receives an endowment of 10 Liras. In the second stage, A-player will be prompted by the computer to decide how much of the initial endowment to keep and how much to send to a paired B-player. The amount sent will always be in whole Lira. The A-Player will keep any money s/he has not sent to B-Player.
A-player will see the following screen:
Screen 5
Completion of Rounds
After completing each period, the computer will proceed to the next period, which will be conducted identically to the previous period. After every 3 periods, every A-player will be grouped with a different B-player and every B-player will be grouped with a different A-player.
You will not be grouped with the same participant twice.
Once all periods have been completed, you will be paid your cumulative income.
Please answer the questions that appear on your screen. You will be paid 50 cents for every correct answer. The experiment will begin after all the participants have answered all the questions.
The following questions appeared on subjects' screen. Answers are provided next to the questions.
